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The Death-of-Tragedy Myth 
Thomas F. Van Laan 
"After Aristotle, Hegel, and Nietzsche," Lionel Abel wrote in 1963, "it 
should be possible to talk with some degree of clarity about tragedy. Yet that 
dramatic form, so famous and so honored, is continually rendered less clear 
by the discourse of critics, the chatter of journalists, and the plays of even 
skilled dramatists."1 Abel's remarks mix a certain amount of truth with matter 
of a more dubious kind, and it is the second sentence, I suggest, that contains 
the surest element of truth. His remarks appeared during the thickest flurry 
of writing on tragedy that the world has ever known (roughly, the period from 
shortly after the end of the Second World War through the late 1960s), the 
results of which amply confirm his charge. The ratio between the quantity of 
writing on tragedy and the increase of obscurity about it is easy to explain: 
anyone who has seen or read even a few tragedies and then read even a small 
selection of the voluminous studies of the form has every reason to conclude 
that writing about tragedy is not unlike writing about religion or politics, with 
all the implications of over-reliance on "revealed" views, partiality to particular 
authorities, insufficient consideration of the subject matter, inattentiveness, 
ignorance, and self-revelation that my comparison is meant to suggest. The 
more dubious matter in Abel's remarks is the notion that we ought to have 
some degree of clarity about tragedy because of the contributions of three 
figures who, writing out of different cultural assumptions, having different axes 
to grind, and preferring different examples of the form, produced such 
different and nearly incompatible conceptions of tragedy. Indeed, Aristotle, 
Hegel, and Nietzsche must be given some of the blame for the obscurity about 
which Abel complains. In the theory-of-tragedy industry, they are the patron 
saints and church fathers or, alternatively, the schismatics and heretics, the 
Edmund Burkes, Thomas Jeffersons, Karl Marxes, and/or John Birches.2 
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Abel's remarks are additionally vulnerable because of their self-confident 
tone, implying that their speaker is himself of course free from any blame for 
the increasing obscurity. Despite this tone, Abel has much to answer for. The 
book containing his remarks constitutes his primary share in one of the major 
"contributions" of the flurry of the 1950s and 60s: the notion, subsequently 
often accepted as dogma, that at some point-usually assumed to be the close 
of Racine's career-tragedy suffered an unfortunate, but unequivocal, demise. 
I call this notion the "death-of-tragedy myth," and since tragedy is often 
associated in various ways with myth, I want to make it clear that I use "myth" 
in its popular sense as something that is believed by many while remaining 
essentially untrue, although more exact senses of "myth" also apply here-for 
instance, its capacity to pre-shape thinking about specific examples and aspects 
of reality that presumably fall within its area of reference. The writers most 
responsible for the formulation and dissemination of this myth are, in addition 
to Abel, Joseph Wood Krutch (whose version of it first appeared in 1929 but 
was reprinted during the flurry) and George Steiner, but numerous others have 
helped to spread the gospel, including several whose studies of tragedy do not 
explicitly assert the notion but implicitly support it by their definitions and their 
treatments of post-Racinian plays.3 
This myth is well worth dispelling. It stands in the way of any reasonably 
objective study of nineteenth- and twentieth-century plays and novels, of 
properly understanding and evaluating writers like Ibsen, O'Neill, and 
Tennessee Williams (if one believes, as I do, that they wrote tragedies), and 
of even properly defining tragedy (if one believes, as I do, that the canon of 
tragedy has been extended during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and 
the nature of tragedy modified in the process). It is not, however, an easy task 
to prove a negative (i.e., that the notion of the death of tragedy is not true). 
One might appeal to alternative authorities-those who write about post-
Racinian literature as if the myth had never been formulated-but aside from 
demonstrating that other views are possible, this is not a very helpful 
procedure since the alternative authorities are for the most part much less 
impressive writers and therefore not all that authoritative. Or one might try 
to demonstrate the existence of genuine tragedy during the periods in question, 
but even if the demonstration were confined to one sure example it would 
require articulating a conception of tragedy that both fits the example and is 
itself authoritative, and, given the existing confusion about tragedy, any such 
demonstration would take an inordinate amount of space.4 Since neither of 
these procedures is practical, I have decided to try to show that the myth had 
no business ever existing, that the very methodologies, arguments, assumptions, 
inconsistencies, and motives of its formulators clearly show that it is not at all 
a reasonable observation derived from observed evidence but rather a fiction 
dreamt up by the observers. I shall support this assertion by examining in 
detail the discussions of the myth's three primary formulators, Krutch, Abel, 
and Steiner, taking them slightly out of chronological order so that I may treat 
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the issues concerning tragedy that they raise in a sequence that seems to me 
logically appropriate. From time to time, when it seems useful, I shall 
supplement this examination by glancing at the work of the lesser apostles 
listed in note 3. 
I 
Joseph Wood Krutch's contribution to the formulation of the myth is a 
chapter ("The Tragic Fallacy") from The Modern Temper: A Study and a 
Confession, which first appeared in 1929 and was reprinted with a new preface 
in 1956.5 Krutch claims that we still need tragedy but no longer produce it and 
are gradually losing the capacity to get even remotely in touch with the 
tragedies of the past, let alone to appreciate them. The "mechanistic, 
materialistic, and deterministic conclusions of science" (xiii) have deprived us 
of our "tragic faith" (96), our belief in "the glorious vision of human life" (79) 
out of which tragedy arose. By the nineteenth century, "God and Man and 
Nature had all somehow dwindled" and there had occurred an "enfeeblement 
of the human spirit," a "weakening of man's confidence in his ability to impose 
upon the phenomenon of life an interpretation acceptable to his desires" 
(81-2). Man had lost the capacity to believe in his own "greatness and 
importance," had come to see himself as merely "mean" and "petty." And it is 
precisely this, Krutch feels, that made tragedy impossible, since its "essential 
nature" consists in its being "a representation of actions considered as noble" 
(83-4). Hence the high rank of the traditional tragic hero: 
the tendency to lay the scene of a tragedy at the court of a king is 
not the result of any arbitrary convention but of the fact that the 
tragic writers believed easily in greatness just as we believe easily in 
meanness. To Shakespeare, robes and crowns and jewels are the 
garments most appropriate to man because they are the fitting 
outward manifestation of his inward majesty, but to us they seem 
absurd because the man who bears them has, in our estimation, so 
pitifully shrunk. (91) 
Hence also tragedy's concern with the cosmos: 
the Tragic Fallacy [Krutch's variation on "pathetic fallacy"] depends 
ultimately upon the assumption which man so readily makes that 
something outside his own being, some 'spirit not himself-be it 
God, Nature, or that still vaguer thing called a Moral Order-joins 
him in the emphasis which he places upon this or that and confirms 
him in his feeling that his passions and his opinions are important." 
(93) 
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And hence, finally, what Krutch perceives--he does not say so explicitly, 
but the implication is unequivocal-as the defining feature of tragedy: its 
affirmation. Modern serious plays, he writes, "produce in the reader a sense 
of depression," while tragedy generates "elation"; "the reading of Oedipus or 
Lear" when we of this "remoter and emotionally enfeebled age" have the "rare 
good fortune" to enter into their "spirit as completely as it is possible for us" 
to do so, gives us a "feeling of exultation" (81-2). The action of tragedy "is 
usually, if not always, calamitous," but it is so "because it is only in calamity 
that the human spirit has the opportunity to reveal itself triumphant over the 
outward universe which fails to conquer it" (84). "All works of art which 
deserve their name have a happy end," and tragedy fits this criterion by 
satisfying "the universally human desire to find in the world some justice, some 
meaning, or, at the very least, some recognizable order. Hence it is that every 
real tragedy, however tremendous it may be, is an affirmation of faith in life, 
a declaration that even if God is not in his Heaven, then at least Man is in his 
world" (85-6). Given his thorough belief that affirmation-of the human spirit 
and of the values it desires-is both the defining feature and the ultimate 
function of tragedy, it is not at all surprising to see Krutch making so extreme 
a statement as the following: "Though its [tragedy's] conclusion must be, by its 
premise, outwardly calamitous, though it must speak to those who know that 
the good man is cut off and that the fairest things are the first to perish, yet 
it must leave them, as Othello does, content that this is so. We must be and 
we are glad that Juliet dies and that Lear is turned out into the storm" (85). 
The showpiece of Krutch's discussion is his comparison of Hamlet and a 
modern play, for which he chooses Ghosts, because, he says, it "was not only 
written by perhaps the most powerful as well as the most typical of modern 
writers but . . . is, in addition, the one of his works which seems most nearly 
to escape that triviality which cannot be entirely escaped by anyone who feels, 
as all contemporary minds do, that man is relatively trivial" (89). His ranking 
of Ghosts among Ibsen's works is, of course, highly debatable, and, given what 
he has already written about it in this chapter, one might conclude that the 
choice is the result of calculation rather than belief. Ghosts, Krutch has stated, 
exemplifies the "trivial miseries" of a too sophisticated age: "When its heroes 
(sad misnomer for the pitiful creatures who people contemporary fiction) are 
struck down it is not, like Oedipus, by the gods that they are struck but only, 
like Oswald Alving, by syphilis, for they know that the gods, even if they 
existed, would not trouble with them, and they cannot attribute to themselves 
in art an importance in which they do not believe." Thus Ghosts is typical of 
the modern era's "so-called tragedies," in which "mean misery piles on mean 
misery, petty misfortune follows petty misfortune, and despair becomes 
intolerable because it is no longer even significant or important" (88). 
The comparison itself begins with a brief paragraph on Hamlet, emphasiz-
ing the protagonist's "good fortune to be called upon to take part in an action 
of cosmic importance" (89)~restoring the balance of the universe-and his 
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dying not in failure but in success: "in the process by which that readjustment 
is made a mighty mind has been given the opportunity, first to contemplate 
the magnificent scheme of which it is a part and then to demonstrate the 
greatness of its spirit by playing a role in the grand style which it called for. 
We do not need to despair in such a world if it has such creatures in it" (90). 
Then follows an even briefer paragraph on Ghosts: 
Turn now to Ghosts-look upon this picture and upon that. A young 
man has inherited syphilis from his father. Struck by a to him 
mysterious malady he returns to his northern village, learns the 
hopeless truth about himself, and persuades his mother to poison 
him. The incidents prove, perhaps, that pastors should not endeavor 
to keep a husband and wife together unless they know what they are 
doing. But what a world is this in which a great writer can deduce 
nothing more than that from his greatest work and how are we to 
be purged or reconciled when we see it acted? Not only is the 
failure utter, but it is trivial and meaningless as well. (90) 
Krutch has more to draw from his comparison in subsequent pages, but it is 
rather repetitious of his more general claims and can be passed over in silence. 
The first thing that should be noticed about Krutch's discussion is that 
instead of trying to demonstrate his thesis through argument he relies on 
assertion, elegant, almost evangelistic, language, and, in addressing our present 
circumstances and the works produced in response to them, ridicule. The 
confirmation of his claims, in other words, depends entirely on the authority 
of their speaker, and as a result that authority becomes an issue worthy of 
attention. Fortunately, three years prior to the reprinting of The Modern 
Temper Krutch published another book discussing modernism and drama that 
casts some very interesting light on this issue: "Modernism" in Modern Drama: 
A Definition and an Estimate.6 This is a rather sloppy book: he gets wrong the 
details of the ending of Rosmersholm (16), he completely misunderstands 
Hedda Gabier and Ibsen's attitude toward his title character (18), he calls 
Strindberg (more than once) a Dane. Items like this suggest that similar 
features of "The Tragic Fallacy"--the misquotation of The Tempest ("Oh, rare 
new world. . . ," 84), the overly casual reference (apparently to The Master 
Builder) that "Ibsen once made one of his characters say that he did not read 
much because he found reading 'irrelevant' . . ." (88), the cursory and slanted 
summaries of Hamlet and Ghosts~v/ere not, as they might seem there, the 
marks of a "cool" and sophisticated belletrism but rather those of someone 
who has managed to "impose upon the phenomenon of [tragedy] an interpreta-
tion acceptable to his desires" and prefers spinning it out ever more elaborately 
to checking it against the sources from which, perhaps, it originally sprung. I 
say "perhaps" because a far more important feature of "Modernism" in Modern 
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Drama is its virtual recantation of the claims about tragedy that Krutch was to 
reprint, unchanged, three years later. 
In "Modernism, " after conceding to Strindberg a notion of "the essence of 
man's tragic dilemma" (25), he goes on to discuss Ghosts in entirely different 
--and far more accurate-terms than in "The Tragic Fallacy": 
it has been wrongly said that the hero is Oswald Alving. . . . [ ! ] 
Actually the real protagonist is not the helpless victim Oswald but 
his mother; the tragic guilt is, ultimately, not that of society but of 
the protagonist herself because she listened to Parson Manders in 
whom she did not really believe and because she submitted to the 
opinion of the community instead of following her own inward light 
which told her, from the beginning, that what she was doing was 
wrong. Before the play is over she asserts herself and earns the 
right to be called a heroine when she finally rejects the hypocritical 
morality preached by society and does what she herself believes to 
be right. It is too late to prevent the evils which her earlier 
wrongdoing had created. Therefore, as is often the case in tragedy, 
the hero achieves a triumphant clarification though he can no longer 
save either himself or the others. (40) 
Later in the volume, Krutch states that both Eugene O'Neill and Maxwell 
Anderson, "men whose most serious effort has obviously been to write for 
moderns plays which have some of the essential characteristics of traditional 
tragedy," "could be most simply classified as writers of tragedy" (117). And he 
would gladly extend a similar classification to Arthur Miller and Tennessee 
Williams but feels that it is still too early to judge (123-30). 
These statements strongly indicate that in 1953 Krutch no longer believed 
the claims he formulated in 1929 and was to reprint, unchanged, in 1956~if he 
actually believed them in 1929: the O'Neill "tragedies" he most emphasizes are 
The Hairy Ape (produced and published in 1922) and Desire Under the Elms 
(produced and published in 1924), both of which Krutch knew long before he 
originally presented his views on the "modern temper" (he reviewed Desire 
Under the Elms enthusiastically for the Nation when it was produced, and in 
this review he refers knowledgeably to The Hairy Apé along with other O'Neill 
plays).7 As he discusses O'Neill and Anderson in "Modernism," Krutch seems 
suddenly to remember his argument from 1929, for he decides to call them 
"anti-modernists" (123), and he reverts to his earlier view of Ghosts in saying 
that O'Neill's "most nearly heroic figures have always been those who, like 
Yank in The Hairy Ape or Ephraim Cabot in Desire Under the Elms, belong to 
something larger than themselves which confers dignity and importance on 
them. They are not, like Oswald Alving, mean victims" (118). It is, however, 
too late to undo the damage that has been done to the claims of "The Tragic 
Fallacy." 
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Krutch's no longer fully believing these claims when they were offered to 
the world for a second time severely undermines the authority of their speaker, 
which, as I have said, is the only evidence in "The Tragic Fallacy" for the 
validity of the claims. But even without Krutch's recantation the original 
claims are sufficiently vulnerable in themselves because of the conception of 
tragedy on which they are based. Among writers on tragedy, Krutch is a 
"distortionist"-that is, one who focuses on a particular (supposed) quality of 
the form and balloons it into not just a sine qua non but, in essence, the whole. 
A "strict-constructionist," such as I. A. Richards, would reject the idea of the 
affirmation of tragedy out of hand.8 But this seems much too strict, and it is 
probably wiser to accept Louis L. Martz's claim that while "tragedy seems 
never to know what Wallace Stevens calls 'an affirmation free from doubt'. . . 
it always seems to contain at least the Ghost of an affirmation."9 
For Krutch, what tragedy affirms is the "human spirit," our "faith in life," 
the "greatness of human nature"; his focus is on "Man." He is rather vague 
about the process, but if one thinks of virtually any protagonist of traditional 
tragedy it is not difficult to see represented somewhere in the course of his or 
her career-most often at the moment of recognition and/or in response to the 
catastrophe—something of what Krutch has in mind, although it is not 
necessarily the same "something" for each protagonist. The Oedipus of 
Oedipus Tyrannus not only endures the horror compelling him to blind himself, 
he also accepts responsibility for what he has done even though he had striven 
to avoid it. Antigone is willing to go to her death for what she believes in, 
while Creon comes fully to know both the error of his actions and their 
devastating consequences for him. Hamlet, despite the havoc he has ex-
perienced and helped to bring about, is thought worthy to have flights of 
angels sing him to his rest. Othello, however much he may resist full 
recognition in his final soliloquy, defines his suicide at least in part as a moral 
action appropriately responsive to his killing Desdemona. Macbeth, despite his 
evil, impresses us through the quality of his mind, and he to some extent 
resumes his original identity as a heroic warrior when confronted by Macduff, 
even though-or because-he knows that all is lost. Even Lear, protagonist of 
the most tragic of tragedies, not only endures his extraordinary suffering but 
also comes to a new and better understanding through it, although, to quote 
Krutch on Mrs. Alving, he does so too late to "save either himself or the 
others." And there may even be tragic protagonists who exert "defiance unto 
death in a hopeless battle against gods and fate."10 
Nor is it just the greatness of its protagonist that tragedy may affirm. 
The destruction of Oedipus and Jocasta is also an affirmation of the oracles 
whose validity they both so vigorously, and so desperately, sought to deny, and 
this is in keeping with the tendency of tragedy, noted by many commentators, 
to suggest the existence of some sort of order outside the protagonist and of 
which the protagonist may be a victim, whether that order be fate, necessity, 
the will of the gods, a divinity that shapes our ends, a principle of justice or 
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morality, or merely the way things are-or, as Timothy Reiss would argue, the 
values of the community for which the tragedy is written.11 Finally, as Murray 
Krieger points out, tragedy "can remain a force for affirmation through its 
formal powers alone," through "the disciplining and restricting demands upon 
aesthetic contemplation made by the rounded aesthetic whole."12 
It is by no means clear, however, what these apparent affirmations 
ultimately signify. Much ink has been spilled on other topics pertaining to 
tragedy, especially catharsis, but the relation between affirmation and tragedy, 
one of the most problematic of the possible topics, has not been adequately 
discussed. I have, for example, just identified three kinds of affirmation, and 
this raises the question whether they are really all aspects of a single quality. 
Furthermore, are any or all of them substantive as opposed to accidental 
criteria? The affirmation achieved through form would seem to be substantive, 
but tragedy's affirming the greatness of its protagonist may very well be a by-
product of its needing, if it is to define fully the devastation it dramatizes, the 
kind of protagonist that can endure more than ordinary suffering, that has the 
capacity to grasp and express what is happening, and that has sufficient worth 
so that we are not tempted to see his or her experience in terms of some 
simplistic moral formula. Again, if the various kinds of affirmation are in fact 
all aspects of a single quality, do the affirmations dramatized by a particular 
tragedy add up to the affirmation with a capital A of Martz's remark and 
Krutch's whole discussion? Is, in other words, affirmation in this general sense 
actually a specific element-i.e., a fundamental, essential constituent-of 
tragedy? And if so, where, exactly, does it stand in the hierarchy of elements 
constituting the form? Finally, if affirmation is in fact a-or the-key element 
of tragedy, is what tragedy affirms, as Krutch supposes, the things that we want 
affirmed? I raise these questions for two reasons: to suggest my own feeling 
that affirmation is a limited and uncertainly significant aspect of tragedy, and 
to point out the kind of issues that are ignored by the affirmationists, who do 
not consider affirmation but celebrate it. 
In fact, discussion of this topic usually seems doomed to produce the kind 
of inflated language typical of Krutch's account and to prompt the commen-
tator to blow it up out of all proportion to any actual place it may have in the 
complex that is tragedy. This, then, is the basic problem with Krutch's claims, 
for when affirmation is made out to be the defining characteristic and the 
ultimate purpose of tragedy, what is being discussed is something quite 
different from tragedy, although it is often mistaken for it. This result is even 
more evident in the writings of other affirmationists. Robert Heilman, for 
example (see note 3), writes of how, in tragedy, "man salvages, from the ruins 
of the present, the essential human powers on which continuity depends" (160), 
but as he refines and illustrates this idea, as in the following sentence, it 
becomes cruder and cruder until its terms end up being purely moral: 
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. . . understanding is the natural completion or resolution of the 
division in which tragedy originates. The true object of understand-
ing is what has been the object of misunderstanding-the motive or 
step that has caused or constituted the flaw or error, be it a misdeed 
with unforeseen consequences or a monstrous crime. (241)1 
Dorothea Krook (see note 3), who so celebrates affirmation that she makes it 
one of her four "universal elements of tragedy" (8-9) and, as she constantly 
implies, by far the most important of the four, goes even further in her major 
account of it: 
In the greatest tragedy, I suggest, what is in the end affirmed is 
something more than the dignity of man and the value of human 
life. We are made to feel that, through the affirmation of man and 
the life of man, there is at the same time being affirmed an order 
of values transcending the values of the human order. This order 
of values is not, or is not felt to be, a mere projection of the human 
mind; it is felt to have a real, objective existence-an existence 
independent of, other than, and antecedent to man and the life of 
man. At the same time, however, it has the closest bearing on the 
life of man, in particular on the conduct of men; therefore, it is 
properly described as moral-a moral order, in the most inclusive 
sense of the term. (14-15) 
What she ultimately seems to mean is perhaps best exemplified by a passage 
from the conclusion of her discussion of Middleton's Women Beware Women 
as a successful tragedy in the "low-mimetic" mode: "The same simplicity [of 
language] makes the moral point of the whole tragic tale in Hippolito's 
memorable statement: 
Lust and forgetfulness has been among us 
And we are brought to nothing. (V.i.187-88)" (182). 
Krutch does not explicitly take affirmation as far as this, but his fellow 
affirmationists show how close his view of tragedy comes to redefining it as 
morality play in fancy dress. 
II 
Lionel Abel's primary contribution to establishing the myth, Metatheatre, 
came out in 1963, and four years later he helped to further its hold by editing 
an anthology of writings about tragedy that includes both a substantial 
introduction and an additional piece by him.14 Metatheatre is less a book than 
a collection of essays (not all of which discuss tragedy or even "Metatheatre"), 
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and, apparently as a result, it offers a number of assertions about tragedy that 
are never really brought together in a single coherent conception. Some of 
these assertions are indicated in what follows, but I make no attempt to piece 
them all together into any unified conception, because, as will become clear, 
doing so is not necessary for my purposes. 
The two most important essays for Abel's views on the fate of tragedy are 
"Genet and Metatheatre" (76-83) and "Tragedy-or Metatheatre" (107-13). 
Abel states, "I shall not say that tragedy is impossible, or, as George Steiner 
has suggested, dead"; he does not, however, know of any modern examples of 
it and is sure that its re-emergence would depend on conditions that are not 
now foreseeable (112). It has been impossible for most Western dramatists 
and for very clear reasons: 
Why have most Western dramatists, bent on writing tragedy, been 
unable to do so successfully? Much of their difficulty can be 
summed up in a single word: self-consciousness. First, the self-
consciousness of the dramatist himself, and then that of his 
protagonists. For consider: if Antigone were self-conscious enough 
to suspect her own motives in burying her brother Polynices, would 
her story be a tragic one? Now the Western playwright is unable to 
believe in the reality of a character who is lacking in self-conscious-
ness. Lack of self-consciousness is as characteristic of Antigone, 
Oedipus, and Orestes, as self-consciousness is characteristic of 
Hamlet, that towering figure of Western metatheatre. 
Another, insurmountable difficulty: one cannot create 
tragedy without accepting some implacable values as true. Now the 
Western imagination has, on the whole, been liberal and skeptical; 
it has tended to regard all implacable values as false. (77) 
This explains why, according to Abel, no "real" tragedies have been produced 
since fifth-century-B.C. Athens except for Shakespeare's Macbeth (5) and a few 
plays by Racine. There are no tragedies by Schiller, although "Mary Stuart, 
which he called a tragedy, is almost convincing as one" (73). Ibsen tried to 
write tragedy but failed, because "the 'fatality' suggested in his dramas remains 
suggested, and does not convince us finally"~it is merely imposed on his 
characters—and because he tried to express ideas, while "in a true tragedy one 
is beyond thought" (109-10). O'Neill, Williams, and Miller, "all continuers and 
imitators of Ibsen," have fared no better (110-12). 
There is, however, no cause for alarm, since Western self-consciousness 
has produced a new, appropriate, dramatic form to replace the one lost: the 
metaplay: 
. . . the plays I am pointing at do have a common character: all of 
them are theatre pieces about life seen as already theatricalized. By 
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this I mean that the persons appearing on stage in these plays are 
there not simply because they were caught by the playwright in 
dramatic postures as a camera might catch them, but because they 
themselves knew they were dramatic before the playwright took note 
of them. What dramatized them originally? Myth, legend, past 
literature, they themselves. They represent to the playwright the 
effect of dramatic imagination before he has begun to exercise his 
own; on the other hand, unlike figures in tragedy, they are aware 
of their own theatricality. (60) 
Metatheatre is distinguished not only by the self-consciousness of its characters 
but also by plays-within-the-play, characters behaving toward others as a 
dramatist might, the sense of life as a dream, and fantasy. The form is in 
effect invented by Shakespeare with Hamlet, and examples of it include many 
other of his plays, Calderon's Life is a Dream, Goethe's Faust, Ibsen's Peer 
Gynt, Pirandello's Six Characters in Search of an Author, and most of the plays 
that Martin Esslin mislabeled as "Theatre of the Absurd." We should, Abel 
strongly suggests, "stop lamenting the 'death' of tragedy and value justly the 
dramatic form which Western civilization—and that civilization only—has been 
able to create and to refine" (113). 
Abel's "Introductory Remarks" for Modems on Tragedy and his own 
contribution to the anthology, "Is There a Tragic Sense of Life?" (175-87), do 
not discuss metatheatre, but they expand upon and sometimes add to his 
assertions about tragedy and offer some clarifications of his reasons for 
insisting that tragedy has been impossible for most post-Greek dramatists. 
One inconsistency between the two volumes is that in Metatheatre Abel finds 
Hegel to be wrong not only about Antigone but also about the "altogether 
incorrect-though original and interesting-theory of tragedy" that he derived 
from his interpretation of it (4) while in Modems on Tragedy Abel finds that 
Hegel was correct after all and uses him centrally as a source and support for 
his own theory of tragedy (183ff.) But this inconsistency does not materially 
affect Abel's conception of tragedy or his claims about the incapacity of 
Western self-consciousness to produce it. A possibly more serious 
inconsistency occurs in one of the sentences expounding his theory when Abel 
refers to "the lesser masters of the art of tragedy," naming "Euripides, Webster, 
and Tourneur at their best" and "Shakespeare in his unsuccessful tragedies, 
Troilus and Cressida, Coriolanus, Timon of Athens and King Lear" (181). But 
this may be a slip of the pen rather than the opening to a recantation in the 
manner of Krutch. 
A definite problem with Abel's reading of the history of World Drama is 
that too much of it is left completely out of the account. Only a few plays 
between the Greeks and the twentieth century seem worthy to be graced with 
the appellation "metatheatre," and it is unclear, as a result, what we are to 
make of the rest. Ibsen's later plays, for example, are denied the status of 
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tragedy, and yet they are not metatheatre either, for, according to Abel, he 
abandoned the form after Peer Gynt. So what are they? And what is Ibsen? 
--not to mention the dramatists who followed his lead. Are they simply 
irrelevancies in the two-stage history of drama Abel defines? I am also 
troubled by a categorization that lumps together Hamlet, Twelfth Night, and 
The Tempest, however similar they may be in Abel's sense, without paying any 
attention to the important differences distinguishing them, differences that 
have always been perceived as differences in genre. But I shall let these 
objections pass, since it is Abel's conception of tragedy that I am really after. 
In her review of Metatheatre, Susan Sontag is highly laudatory, claiming 
that Abel's argument is, "in the main, absolutely right." She does, however, 
take strong exception to an assertion of his that some of the other writers on 
tragedy would also disagree with: that "one cannot create tragedy without 
accepting some implacable values as true." After stating that "Abel con-
siderably oversimplifies, and I think indeed misrepresents, the vision of the 
world which is necessary for the writing of tragedies," she adds: 
If the fate of Oedipus was represented and experienced as tragic, it 
is not because he, or his audience, believed in "implacable values," 
but precisely because a crisis had overtaken those values. It is not 
the implacability of "values" which is demonstrated by tragedy, but 
the implacability of the world. The story of Oedipus is tragic insofar 
as it exhibits the brute opaqueness of the world, the collision of 
subjective intention with objective fate. After all, in the deepest 
sense, Oedipus is innocent; he is wronged by the gods, as he himself 
says in Oedipus at Colonus. Tragedy is a vision of nihilism, a heroic 
or ennobling vision of nihilism.15 
This is, in my opinion, in spite of some of its details a generally incisive 
conception of tragedy and therefore a devastating indictment of Abel's 
conception and of the argument issuing from it. But the point at issue is one 
of the most active battlefields in the politico-religious wars constituted by 
writers on tragedy, and the unconditional surrender of implacable values 
cannot be brought about here. Fortunately, Abel's formulation of the myth 
can be easily dispelled without it. 
The basic problem with his conception of tragedy is that he is a "narrow-
definitionist"-as was Aristotle, as was Hegel, as have been so many of those 
seeking to define the form. That is to say, Abel derives his conception from 
far too small-and temporally- and geographically-limited-a base. For him, 
tragedy and Greek tragedy are essentially one and the same; as he remarks 
in the anthology, "'tragedy' remains a Greek word in no matter what language 
we speak" (15). Metatheatre would prompt one to assume that tragedy is to be 
defined in such a way as to encompass every Greek play that has been called 
a tragedy, for Abel not only finds a place in his scheme for Oedipus at 
SPRING 1991 12 
Colonus-v/hereas many, including Steiner and other strict-constructionists, 
would exclude it from the canon--but even uses it to represent the second (and 
apparently more important) of "the two essential movements of tragedy" (2). 
And yet, in his "Introductory Remarks" for the anthology, Abel disenfranchises 
Euripides, "the first of the Greek playwrights . . . who tried to write tragedy 
without being able to situate in a cosmic frame [any such frame having been 
destroyed by the Sophists] the catastrophes with which he wanted to move the 
public to pity and fear" (19). And the base may be even narrower than the 
exclusion of Euripides indicates, for the only plays by Aeschylus and Sophocles 
that Abel discusses in any detail, in either book, are the Oresteia, Oedipus 
Tyrannus, Oedipus at Colonus, and Antigone; he mentions no other plays by 
Aeschylus, and of Sophocles' other tragedies he mentions only Electra. Abel 
is appalled, moreover, by the suggestion that tragedy might be an evolving 
form rather than one eternally fixed before the advent of Euripides. He 
includes in the anthology an excerpt from H. D. F. Kitto's book on Greek 
tragedy, but he attacks Kitto's view "that Euripides wrote tragedy, though of 
a different kind from Sophocles, as Sophocles . . . wrote a different kind of 
tragedy from Aeschylus": "To carry Kitto's reasoning further, we would have 
to say that Shakespeare wrote a fourth kind of tragedy . . . and Racine a fifth. 
And after all these qualifications of tragedy, we would be even less clear as to 
what tragedy is" (20). 
A passion for clarity can, of course, easily lead to over-simplification and 
distortion, especially if one employs vague terms like "kind" rather than more 
exact terms of classification such as "species" and "subspecies." Setting aside 
possible presuppositions like the one above about the Sophists and another I 
shall have occasion to mention later, I imagine Abel developing his conception 
of tragedy from an examination, in the order in which they appeared, of the 
major surviving Greek plays bearing that label and finalizing his conception as 
soon as he ran into any threatened lack of clarity posed by characteristics, as 
in the plays of Euripides, different from those he had already met. The danger 
in such a process is the likelihood of stopping before acquiring the ability to 
distinguish between accidental characteristics and substantive ones, as if, having 
seen only four or five trees, one were to conclude that deciduousness was a 
substantive characteristic of being a tree. 
The major stumbling-block for the scenario put forth in Metatheatre is 
King Lear. Abel is clearly aware of this, and so he goes at this play with 
undisguised ferocity. In one of his odder pronouncements on tragedy, he 
defines the tragic protagonist, at least in the second of "the essential move-
ments of tragedy," as someone who is or has become "divine, a daemon"~that 
is, "someone made invulnerable to suffering by tragedy" (2, 10). One of the 
reasons Macbeth qualifies as tragedy is that its protagonist is such a daemon, 
while Lear is disqualified through "Shakespeare's signal failure to make King 
Lear daemonic" (8): 
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Shakespeare does make Lear speak marvelously-in a philosophic 
sense about order and anarchy, justice and injustice, lechery and 
virtue—but Lear's daemonic philosophizings do not suffice to make 
the man a daemon. [ . . . . ] Lear, crowned with flowers, is utterly 
weak and defenseless. He cannot protect Cordelia. She is killed 
and he dies unable to avenge her. The movement of the play carries 
him to ultimate weakness, and there is no corresponding movement 
lifting him toward absolute strength. (9) 
He also objects to Lear on the grounds that "Very probably there must be 
something ideal about the structure of the world in which tragedy is possible": 
If the worst were the strongest, or, to use ClaudePs term, the 
"surest," tragedy would be inconceivable. One cannot feel the power 
of loss when there is nothing significant to lose. Thus it is that 
Greek taste, which was most assured on this matter, excluded villains 
from the tragic universe. Shakespeare's taste was not as good, and 
in trying to make of Lear a tragedy he admitted Edmund, Goneril, 
and Regan into the action, giving them the most dynamic roles, too. 
Perhaps this is why he was unable to make Lear daemonic, as the 
play required. (10-11) 
Finally, he objects to Lear as a play "in which the death of each significant and 
appealing character disgusts us with life and with the play, too": 
We cannot accept or be exalted by the deaths of Gloucester, 
Cordelia, or Lear himself. There is no destiriy in any of these 
deaths, for in a true vision of destiny, the contradiction implied by 
the two views [which Abel has found expressed in the play] that (1) 
the gods are wanton in their treatment of us, and (2) the gods are 
just in their treatment of us, would be transcended. The deaths of 
Lear and Gloucester seem to follow from the proposition that the 
gods are just. The death of Cordelia-which Samuel Johnson found 
so objectionable, and which prompted him to suggest that 
Shakespeare was never at his best but always somewhat labored 
when it came to writing tragedy-seems to follow from the proposi-
tion that we are to the gods like flies to wanton boys. So that the 
deaths in King Lear follow from conflicting principles. The work is 
simply not unified. And this is one reason it tends to be ineffective 
on the stage. (28-29) 
Notice the references to Johnson and to the old chestnut about the play's lack 
of stage-worthiness, through which Abel seeks to mount external support for 
his ramshackle argument (it's a wonder he overlooked Tolstoy). Notice as well 
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the wholly inadequate reading of King Lear, whose characters offer not just 
two but several conflicting views of its-in keeping with tragedy-mysterious and 
wholly impenetrable cosmos. 
For me, as for numerous others, King Lear is the tragedy of tragedies, 
and any conception of tragedy that disqualifies it must be seen as wholly 
inadequate either for evaluating a single play or for formulating an argument 
about the form's demise. Nonetheless, in the final analysis Abel's exclusion of 
King Lear is merely illustrative, not definitive. The extreme--the crippling-
narrowness of applicability of his conception of tragedy would still exist even 
if he had managed to find a way to include this play. It might also be argued 
that Abel has selected not just too narrow a base from which to derive a 
conception of tragedy but the wrong narrow base. Brereton (see note 3) has 
managed to develop a quite viable, if incomplete, conception of tragedy 
through examining, essentially, just four plays (Oedipus Tyrannus, Hamlet, 
Macbeth, and Phèdre), and he has been able to do so because these four are 
representative of an important reality, for which other selections might also 
have served. The extant Greek tragedies, even with Euripides excluded, are 
much too diverse, both in form and otherwise, to allow for the framing of a 
very systematic conception of tragedy, particularly so systematic a one as Abel 
seems to desire. The dramatists of the Christian era, however—partly because 
of the influence of Aristotle (and through him of Oedipus Tyrannus), and 
partly because of Christianity's particular version of moral responsibility for 
one's actions—have developed, with some input from theorists, a "modern" 
canon of tragedy in which the various individual examples have much more in 
common than do the surviving Greek plays. It is, by the way, this canon-
which reaches back to include Oedipus Tyrannus and other Greek plays 
resembling it—that is usually under consideration when writers are defining 
"tragedy." 
Ill 
George Steiner's formulation of the myth, Tlie Death of Tragedy,16 
appeared in 1961, two years before Metatheatre. I have saved it for last, 
because it is this book that usually comes to mind as most fully exemplifying 
and establishing the idea that tragedy is no longer possible, and because one 
of the major features of the book reduces its primary claims to the status of 
fiction. 
Steiner's primary argument begins with his title and with the following 
assertion: "From antiquity until the age of Shakespeare and Racine, such 
accomplishment [that of producing tragedy] seemed within the reach of talent. 
Since then the tragic drama is blurred or still. What follows is an attempt to 
determine why this should be" (10). This "attempt" consists primarily of 
Steiner's tracing-far more thoroughly than Krutch or Abel-the causes for the 
demise of tragedy. These are numerous and of several kinds: socio-political, 
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intellectual, imaginative. The most important of them would seem to be the 
complex consisting of a general "falling away of the imaginative" (121); the 
relationship between romanticism and revolution, with its upheaval of past 
hierarchies of all kinds, in art as well as society; Rousseau's successful 
inculcation of the idea that "the quality of being could be radically altered and 
improved by changes in education and in the social and material circumstances 
of existence" (123); the "radical critique of the notion of guilt" and the 
"redemptive mythology" (127) of Rousseau and romanticism generally; and "the 
triumph of rationalism and secular metaphysics" (193), which destroyed the 
notion that "mortal actions are encompassed by forces which transcend man" 
193), called into question "stable and manifest" "hierarchies of worldly power" 
like those prevailing in "Athens, in Shakespeare's England, and at Versailles" 
(194), and eliminated the pre-nineteenth-century "controlling habits of the 
western mind," which had been "symbolic and allegoric" (196). This argument 
concludes, at the end of the book, with the assertion that "tragedy is that form 
of art which requires the intolerable burden of God's presence. It is now dead 
because His shadow no longer falls upon us as it fell on Agamemnon or 
Macbeth or Athalie" (353). 
In formulating his conception of tragedy, Steiner avoids the kinds of 
vulnerability I have attributed to Krutch and Abel. He works from a much 
broader base than Abel would allow, including Euripides and a number of 
post-classical dramatists through Racine, and he even accepts an evolutionary 
view of tragedy—at least up to a point. The conception of tragedy that he 
derives from his chosen base is in many ways sound and convincing. He is no 
distortionist, like Krutch; he gives little attention, for example, to affirmation, 
and when he does address it his account is very cautious (9-10). Steiner is, in 
fact, pretty much a strict-constructionist, who is troubled about admitting the 
Eumenides and Oedipus at Colonus to the canon of tragedy (7-8), and who at 
one point quotes Richards' extreme statement of this position with approval 
(129). In stating that tragedy "requires the intolerable burden of God's 
presence" (353), Steiner would seem to be vulnerable to the same charge that 
Sontag brought against Abel, but in general The Death of Tragedy presents a 
view of tragedy that is constantly, and sensitively, attentive to its dramatization 
not of "implacable values" but of ultimate mystery, of its awareness, for 
example, "that the forces which shape or destroy our lives he outside the 
governance of reason or justice," and that there is "an ironic abyss" "between 
knowledge and action" (6-7).17 
What does make Steiner vulnerable is his being a "pre-judger."18 Instead 
of examining post-Racinian plays claimed to be tragedies and finding them 
deficient or defective in specific respects, he blocks off any possible un-
prejudiced view of them by first focusing on the context in which they were 
written in order to show how certain monumental changes in social life and in 
thought made tragedy no longer possible, thus thrusting the burden of proof 
upon the plays themselves. Indeed, the decision to see these changes as 
SPRING 1991 . 21 
crucial, to see, for example, the "triumph of rationalism and secular 
metaphysics" as marking a "point of no return" (193), also necessarily affects 
his view of what preceded the changes, particularly any conception of tragedy 
that might be used as a standard for judging individual plays. For him, 
whatever characterized tragedies prior to "the point of no return" is intrinsic to 
tragedy, a necessary feature of the form, so that what others might see as 
conventions become for him "natural." He argues, for example, that "the 
natural setting of tragedy is the palace gate, the public square, or the court 
chamber" because of the stable and manifest hierarchies of worldly power in 
Athens, Shakespeare's England, and Versailles (194). He also tries to show, 
though without using the word, that verse is the natural medium of tragedy 
(238-48).19 
Similarly, if there is a "point of no return" with everything prior to it being 
pretty much the same, then everything after it must also be pretty much the 
same, at least to the extent that it must remain unlike what came before. This 
is why, apparently, Steiner insists (most of the time) that the changes in social 
life and thought that he delineates were uniform, universal, and irreversible, 
as opposed to their being, as is more likely the case, challenged in various ways 
by various thinkers and artists, literary and otherwise (Steiner's discussion of 
Buchner-to which I shall return-beautifully illustrates this alternative 
scenario). But Steiner goes even further by characterizing all that follows "the 
point of no return" as not only different from what preceded it but also as 
itself homogeneous. Having demonstrated (fairly convincingly) that Roman-
ticism was untragic, he then adds, "In large measure, we are romantics still." 
He may be correct, but his evidence for this claim consists only of a certain 
kind of pop culture: "The evasion of tragedy is a constant practice in our own 
contemporary theatre and films. In defiance of fact and logic, endings must 
be happy. Villains reform, and crime does not pay. That great dawn into 
which Hollywood lovers and heroes walk, hand in hand, at the close of the 
story, first came up on the horizon of romanticism" (135-36). This is not 
unlike denying tragedy to Shakespeare's era because of the plays of Beaumont 
and Fletcher. 
Furthermore, Steiner delineates the changes not all at once but only as 
he needs them; after using some of the less significant of them (llOff.) to 
dispose of the fairly easy target of high romantic drama, he brings out the 
heavy guns of forces transcending man, stable hierarchies, and symbolic and 
allegoric controlling habits of the Western mind (193ff.) before confronting 
post-romantic drama, a far more formidable opponent; and, with Ibsen, 
Strindberg, and Chekhov looming on the horizon, he returns to his arsenal for 
the necessity of verse (238-48), conducting his discussion in such a way as to 
shoot down in advance a notion like "poetry of the theater" should anyone have 
the temerity to wield it. Nor is Steiner very concerned with consistency: we 
are told, for example, that twentieth-century attempts to restore verse drama 
are without merit since Ibsen and Chekhov showed such attempts to be 
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unnecessary (304), whereas earlier we had heard that the use of prose by these 
dramatists is one reason their plays cannot be regarded as tragedies. 
Steiner is also vulnerable because of another-most astounding—feature 
of his book. It is generally assumed that The Death of Tragedy is unequivocal 
in its insistence that tragedy died out after Racine,20 but this view of the book 
is far from true. Steiner, unlike Krutch, did not need a different book in order 
to contradict himself. Interwoven and competing for prominence with the 
explicit argument corresponding to its title, The Death of Tragedy also contains 
a more implicit counter-argument, which consists primarily of Steiner's 
awarding the status of genuine tragedy to numerous works of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Unequivocal examples are Pushkin's Boris Godunov 
(159), Schiller's Maria Stuart (181), and Buchner's Woyzeck (270-77). In 
addition, Steiner also makes several pronouncements that suggest other 
genuine tragedies might be found as well. The "final arrogance" of the 
protagonist of Byron's Manfred has in it "a grim justice, and it gives to the 
close of Manfred an element of real tragedy" (132). Along with Maria Stuart, 
Schiller's Don Carlos and Wallensteins Tod also "belong to the world of 
tragedy. True, romanticism was anti-tragic; but the romantic age is also that 
of Beethoven" (185). Buchner, "the first who brought to bear on the lowest 
order of men the solemnity and compassion of tragedy" "has had successors: 
Tolstoy, Gorky, Synge, and Brecht" (275). "Tristan und Isolde is nearer to 
complete tragedy than anything else produced during the slack of drama which 
separates Goethe from Ibsen. And nearly as much may be asserted of two 
other operas of the late nineteenth century, Mussorgsky's Boris Godunov and 
Verdi's Otello." "In the twentieth century, opera has further strengthened its 
claim to the tragic succession" through "the coherence and eloquence of tragic 
emotion which we find in the operas of Janacek and Alban Berg," and "it is not 
a play but an opera that now holds out the most distinct promise of a future 
for tragedy," Schoenberg's Moses und Aaron (289). Claudel's Le Soulier de 
Satin is "one of the few plays in modern literature that comes near to being 
great tragedy" (335). Mother Courage looks a lot like tragedy because in "the 
duel between artist and dialectician" fought in this play Brecht "allows the artist 
a narrow but constant margin of victory; incomplete, perhaps, because of the 
redemptive politics which surround it, but real and consuming nevertheless" 
(349). And Beckett may yet produce tragedy, although it is too early to tell, 
and besides he is not writing plays but "antidrama" (349-50). There is, 
moreover, throughout Steiner's book the troubling presence of Ibsen, who, at 
several points, comes in and out of focus as a possible producer of genuine 
tragedy, although Steiner will never allow himself to make a final, unequivocal 
judgment on whether Ibsen is in or out. 
Overall, this is a very impressive list of sure things and near things, 
especially if it is borne in mind how rare tragedy has always been; as Steiner 
quite correctly states, "In the long view . . . it is the existence of a living body 
of tragic drama, not the absence of it, that calls for particular note" (107). 
SPRING 1991 . 23 
Steiner does try to minimize the force of his list of exceptions with such odd 
employments of language as "Maria Stuart... is, with Boris Godunov, the one 
instance in which romanticism rose fully to the occasion of tragedy" (181), but 
the book's counter-argument will not go away. Near the end it even becomes 
explicit in the second item of what Steiner calls "the threefold possibility of our 
theme: that tragedy is, indeed, dead; that it carries on in its essential tradition 
despite changes in technical form; or, lastly, that tragic drama might come 
back to life" (351). He does not mean here that there are three possible views 
(one of which he favors and has consistently argued for) but rather that in the 
final analysis (and despite any further statements to the contrary in the few 
remaining pages of the book) he is unwilling to come out unequivocally for 
any one of the three. 
The impressive counter-argument of Tlie Death of Tragedy is quite 
sufficient, it seems to me, to deprive the more explicit argument's formulation 
of the myth of its validity by indicating that its author was only tentatively 
committed to it. But there is also possible an even more damning scenario for 
Steiner's book. It is difficult to understand why anyone would write a book 
like the one I have described. In speculating on this, and in taking into 
consideration the odd, loose structure of the book (for example, such lengthy 
and apparently extraneous passages as the consideration of why French 
neoclassical tragedy cannot "travel" and the extended analyses of plays by 
Corneille and Racine which seem to have little or nothing to do with either of 
the arguments), I am led to conclude-somewhat reluctantly-that the book 
began as a (selective) survey of the "serious" drama of Europe from Corneille 
and Racine to the coming of Ibsen but was then-perhaps as Steiner realized 
that some sort of argument would make his work more impressive-somewhat 
desultorily turned into a far-from-systematic study of tragedy, the death of 
tragedy, and the causes of that death. To the extent that my speculation is 
true, it makes Steiner's formulation of the myth even more suspect, makes it 
not merely the fiction the book's counter-argument reduces it to, but a fiction 
that even its author may not have genuinely believed. 
One thing, in any event, is unequivocal about the counter-argument of 
The Death of Tragedy: its existence makes the book often assumed to have 
most thoroughly demonstrated the impossibility of tragedy since Racine come 
very close to actually demonstrating the view that I would like to see replace 
the myth—that tragedy survived the changes delineated by Steiner, although 
because of them it had to undergo transformations, just as it had to change 
between the Greeks and Shakespeare and at other times as well. 
IV 
The myth is also seriously undermined by a feature common (to the work 
of all of its purveyors, the difficulty they have in getting around the major 
stumbling-block for their notion (even, to some extent, for Abel, who has his 
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own personal one in King Lear): the world's greatest dramatist since 
Shakespeare, Henrik Ibsen. A typical method of trying to eliminate this 
stumbling-block is to work from ignorance—or feigned ignorance-often, like 
Krutch, by selecting Ghosts as Ibsen's most significant play in terms of tragedy. 
Most of those who select Ghosts, moreover—and this may be their reason for 
doing so-approach it from the standpoint of the never true and now 
thoroughly discredited notion that Ibsen was essentially a writer of problem 
plays: Ghosts cannot be tragic, so runs the paradigm, because it is based on 
what Ibsen takes to be a fundamental truth-that society destroys happiness 
by imposing outworn ideals on us-and the purpose of the play is to free us 
from this destructive influence.21 Another typical method is to employ 
sarcasm, and similar forms of loading the dice, in order to belittle Ibsen, to 
reduce him, as it were, from a stumbling-block to a sort of stile. In addition 
to what he writes about Ghosts in "The Tragic Fallacy," Krutch remarks that 
Ibsen "turned to village politics" in order to find "something small enough for 
him to be able to believe" (89). Heilman discusses Ibsen's plays more 
thoroughly and systematically than Krutch, but he nonetheless also adopts this 
method, as when, to take but one example, he concludes a comparison of 
Milton's Samson and Ibsen's Rosmer (unfavorable to the latter) with "Whereas 
Samson's burden was the knowledge that he had violated the will of God, 
Rosmer knows only that he is weak; and whereas Samson in bringing death 
upon himself is recovering the power to act by God's will, Rosmer is acting by 
his own will and, in the main, getting away from it all'" (253). 
The master of this method is Dorothea Krook. Her examination of Ibsen 
is the most thorough and systematic I have seen from the purveyors of the 
myth, and she strives to demonstrate that her judgment of him as essentially 
untragic is based on the failure of his "modern" plays, with the single exception 
of A Doll House (a "good" rather than "great" tragedy, 35), to conform to her 
definition of tragedy. At every point in her demonstration, however, she helps 
herself along by drawing on the characteristic devices of the method I am 
describing, often coming up with new ones of her own. Although she accepts 
A Doll House as tragedy because of its affirmation of "freedom" (90-93), she 
begins her discussion of it with a long account of "the unpromising conditions 
in which Ibsen attempts to achieve tragedy." These include "the dreary, 
depressing commonplaceness, ordinariness, lack of distinction of Ibsen's social 
material as a whole," "the domestic setting, which is rendered . . . with a 
realism so ferocious as to leave one grasping under the massed weight of its 
triviality," Ibsen's language with "the banality of its colorless, graceless style," 
and, for^4 Doll House itself, both Nora ("What. . . can one do for the ends of 
tragedy with a little child-wife who eats macaroons, plays childish games in the 
nursery, and forges signatures without knowing the law about these things? 
How can such an absurd creature be the vessel of an experience which is 
genuinely tragic?") and "the limiting 'period' aspect of the play-the emancipa-
tion-of-women theme, which for many people today is hopelessly dated, and 
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for some people at any time would seem to offer tragic possibilities of at best 
a rather banal kind." Krook has even more belittling things to say of Hedda 
Gabier and Solness and of Ibsen himself, who "in his blindness [i.e., his 
"pessimism," which is as "inimical to tragedy" as optimism] remains, tragically, 
as incapable of writing tragedy as any romantic lady novelist in hers" (116). 
But she reaches her extreme in her final comment on Ibsen's heroes and 
heroines as a whole: "I hope I may now be allowed to say that I find them all 
not only unsympathetic but positively repellent. I do not like any of them: 
either Nora the little child-wife, or the wearisome tragedy-queens (Hedda 
Gabier, Rebecca West), and dislike most of all Ibsen's bourgeois Tamburlaine, 
Solness the master builder" (238). 
Those, like Abel, Steiner, and Brereton, who treat Ibsen with more 
respect run into various kinds of difficulties that they cannot finally resolve. 
Abel rejects Ibsen as a writer of tragedy on the ground that he tried to express 
ideas while "in a true tragedy one is beyond thought," but then he immediately 
adds, "Actually, Ibsen, supposedly an intellectual playwright, was strikingly 
lacking in ideas" (110), and he subsequently remarks that O'Neill, Williams, 
and Miller "were attracted to Ibsen's form because it suggests the possibility 
of a serious play without the dramatist's having any need to think-except 
dramatically" (110). Ibsen's troubling of The Death of Tragedy is particularly 
in evidence in the book's most sustained discussion of him (289-98), which 
begins by acknowledging his importance: "With Ibsen the history of drama 
begins anew. This alone makes of him the most important playwright after 
Shakespeare and Racine" (290). Steiner dismisses the first four of the 
"modern" plays, including Ghosts, as "tracts" (291), but finds that "in The Wild 
Duck, drama returns to a use of effective myth and symbolic action which had 
disappeared from the theatre since the late plays of Shakespeare" and that 
thereafter "Ibsen succeeded in doing what every major playwright had 
attempted after the end of the seventeenth century and what even Goethe and 
Wagner had not wholly accomplished: he created a new mythology and the 
theatrical conventions with which to express it" (292). Steiner then devotes 
three fine pages to defining this new mythology and particularly the images 
and symbols Ibsen evolved for embodying it (292-95), and the reader is ready 
to believe that through his achievement Ibsen has somehow managed to make 
up for "the decline of the organic world view and of its attendant context of 
mythological, symbolic, and ritual reference" (292). At first Steiner seems to 
agree, for he writes of The Master Builder, Little Eyolf, John Gabriel Borhnan, 
and When We Dead Awaken, "It is in these four plays—and they are among the 
summits of drama-that Ibsen comes nearest tragedy." But, he adds, "it is 
tragedy of a peculiar, limited order," for these plays "are fables of the dead, set 
in a cold purgatory," in which Ibsen, starting "where earlier tragedies end," 
produces plots that "are epilogues to previous disaster" (296), and, moreover, 
"even in these late works, there is a purpose which goes beyond tragedy": 
"There is a way out, even if it leads up to the glaciers. There is no such way 
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for Agamemnon or Hamlet or Phèdre. In the gloom of the late Ibsen the core 
of militant hope is intact" (297). Finally, as Steiner moves on to Strindberg 
and Chekhov, he mentions Ibsen's falling "outside the scope of classic or 
Shakespearean tragedy"--but this is not exactly the point at issue, even for 
Steiner. 
Brereton discusses at some length Peer Gynt and several of the plays from 
Ghosts to The Master Builder (192-211) in a treatment that is often searching 
but finally mitigated by peculiarities of his basic argument and by various 
forms of the "ignorance" I have mentioned above. He never finds any of the 
plays fully qualifying as tragedy, but he then asks, somewhat surprisingly, "Why 
should there be any hesitation in describing Ibsen as a tragic dramatist and his 
plays as tragedies of the only type which could authentically express the spirit 
of his time?" And his answer seems unequivocal: "The present writer accepts 
them as such-some of them-and subscribes to the view that any general 
account of tragic drama must include Ibsen alongside the major names from 
Aeschylus onwards" (211). Immediately, however, he begins introducing 
qualifications to this answer: "the difficulty of entirely squaring Ibsen's plays 
with any definition of the tragic, including that put forward in this book" 
(because of "the ambiguity of the climactic event in certain plays"), and the 
rejection by Ibsen and his characters of "the notion of an external authority, 
and with it that of any general law or sanction" (212). The second qualification 
is a particularly troubling one, for it seems to imply that tragedy requires as 
one of its elements something that Brereton has explicitly excluded as not 
necessary-as he has reminded us as recently as the preceding page: "Is this 
[Ibsen's] a tragic exploration? If one insists that tragedy should transcend 
nature, presumably it is not. But that condition, as we have pointed out, is not 
indispensable." Brereton then goes on, without any clear transition, to suggest 
that Ibsen is to blame for some of the worst abuses of subsequent drama, and 
there is no conceivable explanation for this, unless-adopting a method of 
Krutch, Heilman, and Krook-he is trying to undermine the reader's respect 
and admiration for Ibsen. It is as if Brereton does not really want to admit 
Ibsen to the canon, and has done so simply because he can find no final and 
convincing basis on which to reject him. Brereton's failure to contain Ibsen in 
some kind of coherent view has much the same effect as the similar failures 
of Abel and Steiner and the adoption by Krutch, Heilman, and Krook of the 
methods I have described above. All of them are unwittingly betraying that 
there is something seriously defective in both their conceptions of tragedy and 
their scenarios for the history of drama. 
V 
Given the ease with which the myth collapses under examination, one has 
to wonder why it was ever formulated. The motives of its purveyors are no 
doubt various. One has to assume, despite the contradictions I have exposed, 
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their having at least some belief in the validity of their claims. And, of course, 
these claims are not entirely unrelated to the reality they address. Drama did 
change in certain important ways after Racine. Tragedy had always been rare, 
even in the best of times, but never before had it been so threatened with 
being jostled completely out of sight as it was by the proliferation of lifeless 
imitations of the Greeks and of Shakespeare and his fellows that began in the 
eighteenth century and continued into the twentieth (although the twentieth-
century continuation was to some extent disguised by being heralded as a 
"revival"), and I suspect that all but Krutch were somehow inspired by the 
brouhaha erupting in 1949 in response to the premiere of Death of a Salesman, 
As, moreover, the living drama began to break with tradition and to evolve 
countless new variations in form and style, it became more and more difficult 
to perceive any line of tragic succession, or, indeed, even to continue to think 
in terms of the traditional divisions. It is also true that the changes in society 
and/or sensibility that Abel, Krutch, and particularly Steiner make so much of 
have some basis in fact, although if changes of this sort are to be taken as 
unequivocal proof that tragedy is doomed then Krutch and Steiner must yield 
to Abel because of the important change he sees separating Shakespeare from 
the Greeks. As I shall suggest shortly, however, changes of this sort might 
more accurately be seen as occasioning a resurgence of tragedy rather than 
necessitating its demise. 
One can also discern in the purveyors of the myth personal motives that 
suggest they are making more of the genuine evidence than it justifies. Abel, 
of course, is anxious to let the world know about his discovery, metatheatre, 
and Steiner, as I have suggested, perhaps found himself in search of a thesis. 
But, I suspect, of the personal motives Krutch's are probably the most 
important since, ultimately, they pertain to all the purveyors of the myth. 
Sontag begins her review of Metatheatre by stating, 
Modern discussions of the possibility of tragedy are not exercises in 
literary analysis; they are exercises in cultural diagnostics, more or 
less disguised. [. . .] The burial of a literary form is a moral act, 
a high achievement of the modern morality of honesty. For, as an 
act of self-definition, it is also a self-entombment. Such burials are 
customarily accompanied by all the displays of mourning; for we 
mourn ourselves, when we name the lost potential of sensibility and 
attitude which the defunct form incarnated. (132-33) 
This statement does not go far enough. "The Tragic Fallacy," like The Modern 
Temper as a whole, clearly reveals that Krutch-who eventually retired to a 
desert to cultivate his garden-hated the modern world and yearned, nostalgi-
cally, for a lost ideal that no doubt never existed in a form corresponding to 
his desire. Steiner is much less gloomy, but it is not at all difficult to see 
something quite similar in his analysis. And although Sontag exempts Abel, 
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with his cheery acceptance of metatheatre as a reasonable substitute, from her 
generalization, he, too, betrays at least a trace of the Krutchean motivation in 
remarks like those about the Sophists' destruction of any possible "cosmic 
frame" and the superiority of Greek taste to Shakespeare's. 
A final possible personal motive is, I believe, implicit in the affirmationist 
conception of tragedy held by Krutch and others, for this conception allows its 
adherents to admire tragedy while protecting themselves from any disturbing 
aspects it may exhibit; what Michelle Gellrich (see note 2) has written about 
Hegel's dialectical version of tragedy is equally true, with appropriate 
modifications, of the affirmationists (who, incidentally, probably derive from 
Hegel): "To submit conflict to the pattern of a philosophically grounded 
system, that is, to the controls of reason, however reason may be conceived, is 
to tame its subversive vigor and master its violence within containing 
frameworks whose legitimacy the plays themselves have already called into 
question" (xiii). It is easy to see how this motive may also apply to those 
purveyors of the myth who do not subscribe to affirmation as tragedy's primary 
purpose. What better way is there to "tame" tragedy than to bury it safely in 
the distant past?22 
VI 
The proper antidote to the myth is to study the plays and novels of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries not in order to discover how they justify a 
preconceived idea but to see in what ways some of them may be said to 
continue the tradition of tragedy even as they modify it to bring it into Une 
with the new context or contexts in relation to which they provide the "pleasure 
proper to tragedy." But perhaps, as Reiss argues (see note 2) "continue" is not 
the appropriate word. For Reiss, tragedy is most accurately defined in terms 
not of its form and subject matter but of its function as discourse, a function 
he traces briefly for the Greeks and extensively for the Renaissance and 
neoclassical era. Tragedy, according to Reiss, makes discourse possible for 
each new "sociocultural domain [of] a given time and place" by grasping and 
enclosing "a certain absence of significance'. . . that renders /mpossible, before 
such particular ordering, the meaningfulness of any such a discourse" (2-3). 
Tragedy is not, therefore, a "homogeneous literary discourse" but "simply a 
series of theatrical attempts to invent and grasp what a succession of different 
periods experienced as the inexpressible" (282). Reiss himself supports the 
myth, for although he tentatively sees in our own time the emerging of 
conditions that would make tragedy possible--and necessary-once again (300), 
he denies anything similar for the nineteenth century-at least after Schiller 
--and, through his consideration of Ghosts (see note 21), rejects Ibsen as a 
writer of tragedy. If, however, I correctly understand Reiss's analysis of the 
conditions prevailing at the inception of a new "sociocultural domain," it seems 
to me that the nineteenth century, made bereft of a coherent system of beliefs 
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and values—of a governing metaphysic--by the changes touched on or 
enumerated by writers like Krutch and Steiner, unequivocally qualifies as a 
"moment of 'discursive despair,'" "a time of crisis when . . . systems of action 
have again lost their meaningfulness" (300), thus necessitating "a profound 
reorganization of the political and social order" (282)-as, that is, a time and 
place demanding tragedy. So I gladly modify the sentence opening this 
paragraph to have it urge studying writers like Ibsen in order to see how they 
may be said to have revived tragedy after a period of its extended moribundity. 
I take this line of thought a step further by having one last go at the 
myth. To counteract it once and for all, I propose a counter-myth, so that the 
two may contend with one another in some kind of mythic space while tragedy 
itself emerges free from the fray to become available for reasonably objective 
study. Murray Krieger (see note 12) regards the "cathartic principle" as 
"evidence of the need in tragedy to have dissonance exploded, leaving only the 
serenity of harmony behind." For him, therefore, traditional tragedy itself 
ultimately suppresses "the fearsome chaotic necessities of the tragic vision" 
(132), making that form incompatible with "the self-conscious modernism that 
has dominated the last century and a half of our psychological history; the 
modernism that is characterized by fragmentation rather than by the ever-
united synthesis which Hegel tried valiantly, if vainly, to impose upon it as its 
salvation" (134). Self-conscious modernism, indeed, results in a "modern tragic 
vision" that perceives the "Dionysian without the Appolonian," that perceives 
life as "unalienated, endlessly and unendurably dangerous, finally destructive 
and self-destructive-in short, demoniacal" (137-38), and it is this "modern 
tragic vision" that Krieger explores in his book. Tragedy, I presume, cannot 
exist without the tragic vision, and I also presume that the tragic vision can 
exist only through and because of tragedy. Looked at from this point of view, 
Krieger's analysis, drawing on the same data as the purveyors of the death-
of-tragedy myth, comes close to turning their myth on its head. It is but a 
small step to use his analysis to conclude that traditional tragedy always fell 
short of the potentialities of tragedy and that instead of dying out with the 
advent of the modern era tragedy was not actually born until then. 
Rutgers, University 
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drama" (xii). 
21. This misleading interpretation—and use—of Ghosts still occurs from time to time; as 
late as 1980, it is adopted by Reiss (see note 2), although his version of it (299) is far more 
sophisticated than what one usually finds—for example, in Elder Olson's Tragedy and the Theory 
of Drama (Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1961) 47. Sometimes an even less likely candidate than 
Ghosts is chosen: Heilman, determined to show Ibsen's "eagerness to make points" in his first 
four "modern" plays, ignores Ghosts to focus on An Enemy of the People (42), and Krook finds 
that of all Ibsen's works only A Doll House qualifies as tragedy. 
22. Unsurprisingly, none of the purveyors of the myth that I have discussed or glanced 
at show signs of a fairly common motive for proclaiming-or calling for-the death of tragedy, 
that which stems from a Marxist point of view. The Marxist, such as Augusto Boal in his 
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